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RECONCILING LEGAL PROCESS AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
William L. Reynolds*
INTERPRETATION is the hot constitutional issue these days. Justices
Brennan and Scalia, for example, recently engaged in armed combat on
the proper uses of history in evaluating due process claims.' More gen-
erally, Scalia has been pushing, with some success, a strict construction-
ist/plain meaning approach to interpreting the Constitution, 2 a position
completely at odds with the constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren
Court. 3 Scholars, as might be imagined, have also been active. Indeed, there
is today a vast range of academic thought, some of it impenetrable, on the
question of how the Constitution should be construed. 4
I. INTERPRETIVISM
The present interest in statutory construction has its roots in the decisions
of the Warren Court which revolutionized our constitutional jurisprudence.
The seminal event of this revolution was Herbert Wechsler's wonderful arti-
cle, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, published in 1959.5
Wechsler insisted that the Court must justify its decisions on the basis of
neutral principles. 6 Its opinions, he wrote, should be grounded in articu-
lated reasons, and those reasons should be sufficiently clear so that it can be
determined whether they control other cases. 7 Only when that has been ac-
complished can the basic requirement of adjudication that "like cases be de-
cided in like fashion" be satisfied.8 Because Wechsler focused his analysis on
* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law, A.B. 1967, Dartmouth College;
J.D. 1970, Harvard Law School. I served as a Visiting Professor at Southern Methodist Uni-
versity during the Fall of 1991, and would like to thank the faculty, students, and staff for
making my visit so enjoyable. My thanks to Dave Bogen, Bill Reynolds, Louise Teitz, and
Greg Young for their helpful comments and to Kathy Montroy for her secretarial assistance.
1. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
2. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 111 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 (1991); Bowen
v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 915-16 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 640-66
(1990). Justice Thomas has also advocated this approach. See United States v. R.L.C., 112 S.
Ct. 1329, 1339 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
4. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitu-
tional Adjudication: Three Objections and Response, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226 (1988).
5. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959). Wechsler, of course, was not the first to think of these questions. His article
was very important, however, in starting the current debate.
6. Id. at 10-20.
7. Id. at 15.
8. Id.
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Brown v. Board of Education,9 then only five years old, his writings on the
methodology of interpreting the Constitution received a great deal of atten-
tion. But the use of this methodology was before its time-the focus of the
legal world for the next fifteen years was the substance of the constitutional
revolution wrought by the Warren Court and by the early Burger Court.' 0
Eventually, however, that revolution provoked a reaction. One of the
claims of the counter-revolutionaries was that the Constitution had been
misinterpreted by the Warren Court. Of course, such a charge, to be re-
spectable, must have some theoretical underpinnings, and there was no
shortage of persons eager to supply them.Il
At the same time, those who admired the liberal legacy of the Warren
Court tired of attempting to defend its decisions on the basis of criteria like
language and history. 12 Obviously, they thought that could not be done.
The result was a series of increasingly outr6 defenses of what I call Califor-
nia-style constitutional law ("if it feels good, do it") advocating constitu-
tional protection of values amazingly similar to those held by the typical law
professor (or the left wing of the Democratic party).13
Meanwhile, some scholars began to examine-in true Wechslerian fash-
ion-the various types of arguments that might be advanced while engaged
in constitutional interpretation. The important event here was an original
casebook by Paul Brest (one of the very few casebooks about which that
adjective could be used). 14 Brest helped set the stage for the debate on inter-
pretivism by identifying four types of arguments: one can look at the lan-
guage of the constitution, the history of the constitution, the structure of the
document itself, or at fundamental values. 15 There has been much writing
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Although the accession of Burger and three other Nixon appointees to the Court was
thought to herald a roll-back of Warren Court decisions, the Burger Court in its early years
was every bit as activist as the Warren Court, as Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), illustrates.
See THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent Blasi ed.,
1983).
11. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L.J. 61 (1971).
12. The key article was by Thomas G. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27
STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). Some academics conceded that the Warren Court decisions could
not be defended on traditional grounds, a concession which permitted them to develop their
own innovative approaches to constitutional decision making. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY,
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982). I have commented on
Perry's book in William L. Reynolds, The Constitution, the Courts and Human Rights, 44 MD.
L. REV. 204, 207-15 (1985) (book review). Some of those concessions are unnecessary, I be-
lieve, although they do permit the development of elaborate, if not elegant, models of constitu-
tional decision making.
13. The high (or low) point was Mark Tushnet's statement that a constitutional decision
is correct if it is "likely to advance the cause of socialism." Mark Tushnet, The Dilemmas of
Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411, 424 (1981).
14. PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING (1st ed. 1975).
Unfortunately, later editions of the Brest casebook, although quite innovative themselves, have
abandoned the focus on interpretive methods. See, e.g., PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-MAKING (1st ed. Supp. 1980 & 2d ed. 1983 & 2d
ed. Supp. 1986).




on constitutional interpretation in the fifteen years since publication of the
Brest casebook, but certainly no consensus, scholarly or judicial, has
emerged as to the proper method of interpreting our organic law.
II. LEGAL PROCESS
These developments in the theory of constitutional interpretation must be
viewed against more general theories of judicial decision-making. There are,
of course, more of these theories than a cat has loose hairs. But the predomi-
nant method of looking at decision-making problems, at least from a theoret-
ical vantage point, was-and remains-that of the Legal Process scholars.
The name comes from a casebook written by Professors Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks of Harvard. 16 Although their work was never published for-
mally, it has been enormously influential, and, I think it can fairly be said, all
students of judicial decision-making for the past third of a century have
worked to address the Hart and Sacks approach.
The centerpiece of their methodology is a perhaps naive belief in what
they style "reasoned elaboration." 17 A court engages in reasoned elabora-
tion when it explains its decision by using principles which can then be used
to decide similar cases, as well as to explain how to determine when cases are
similar. To accomplish this, the decision must provide a rationale, grounded
in policy, which provides a coherent basis for resolving like matters and for
determining when matters are "like".18 Legal Process, in other words, seeks
to limit judicial discretion by requiring the court to explain its decision.
That explanation, in turn, makes other decisions more predictable by provid-
ing a basis for reasoning by analogy and makes the court more accountable.
Harry Wellington, former Dean of Yale Law School and a prominent
Legal Process scholar, has recently applied the basic tenets of Legal Process
scholarship to constitutional law. In his slim and elegant book, Interpreting
the Constitution,19 Wellington examines how a Justice using Legal Process
methods might address contemporary constitutional issues. 20 Wellington fo-
cuses largely on Roe v. Wade2' in his development of a decision-making
technique he calls public morality.22 The book is about far more than pri-
vacy, however, and illuminates many other constitutional problems, as well
as areas of traditional common law decision-making. Wellington provides a
16. HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958). The book has been a tentative edition
for over thirty years, and is likely to remain so because both of its authors are now dead. The
materials are widely distributed, however, and a course based on those materials is still taught
at many law schools. It is quite possibly the best casebook ever written. For more on jurispru-
dence according to Hart and Sacks, see G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elabora-
tion, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973). See also Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal Process
Tradition: The Legacy of Hart and Sacks, 29 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1987).
17. HART & SACKS, supra note 16.
18. Id.
19. HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (1990).
20. Id.
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
22. WELLINGTON, supra note 19, at 85.
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useful synopsis and critique of the main approaches to problems of constitu-
tional decision-making. 23 This book will delight the specialist. Because it is
so well-written and so free of jargon; it is readily accessible as well to any
educated reader. For someone who wishes to learn of the serious issues in
constitutional law today, this book is a great place to start.
III. LEGAL PROCESS AND ROE v WADE
The 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade24 generated an enormous amount of
discussion. A prime topic was the source of the Court's authority to hold
that the right to privacy included a woman's right to procure an abortion.25
The specific right was not rooted in the literal text of the Constitution nor
seemed to be fairly implied as a necessary adjunct to interpreting the text.26
Moreover, the precedents that the Court used to support the notion that the
Fourteenth Amendment created a right to privacy were not entirely un-
tainted.27 Some were relics of the pre-New Deal substantive/economic due
process era usually referred to as the now-discredited Lochner era. 28 Two
more were equal protection cases. 29 Griswold v. Connecticut,30 the most re-
cent precedent cited in Roe, had hardly won universal approval with its
vague reliance on constitutional "penumbras. ' '3 1 Finally, the Court's own
laconic explanation of its source of authority hardly contributed to its per-
suasiveness. 32 None of this exegesis could satisfy even a moderately de-
23. Id. Among the delights is Wellington's discussion of the influence of James Bradley
Thayer's influential (but now neglected) work, THE ORIGIN AND SCOPE OF THE AMERICAN
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1893). See WELLINGTON, supra note 19, at 72-78.
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. The first good critical article was John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Com-
ment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973). Ely later wrote that "writing a convincing
criticism of Roe v. Wade was hardly an assignment requiring a rocket scientist. Merely a
kamikaze pilot." Fred R. Shapiro, The Most Cited Articles from the Yale Law Journal, 100
YALE L.J. 1449, 1474 (1991).
26. The Court merely observed that "a line of decisions," perhaps going back to 1891, had
"recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of pri-
vacy, does exist under the Constitution." Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
27. Or on point. The criminal procedure cases cited by the Court seem particularly inap-
posite and, indeed, support the notion that privacy issues are too complex to fit under one all-
purpose heading such as "privacy."
28. This reference is to one of the period's most notorious decisions, Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
29. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Today, we would have no trouble thinking of Skinner as a substantive due process decision.
Because Skinner was decided immediately after the Court's wholesale repudiation in the late
1930's of substantive due process, however, the Court apparently was not willing to use the
Due Process Clause as a basis for the decision.
30. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
31. See id. at 483-84, 487. This was the only time penumbras saw the light of a constitu-
tional day. Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Griswold would have been better served by
reliance on the old doctrine of the equity of the statute as the basis for decision-making. For a
discussion of the equity of statutes see Justice Harlan's opinion in Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), and WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN A NUT-
SHELL 273-74 (2d ed. 1991).
32. After mentioning (but not discussing) the precedents cited above, the Court stated
laconically:
[t]his right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
[Vol. 46
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manding Hart and Sacks scholar as a good example of reasoned elaboration.
Neither the precedents used nor the Court's discussion of them provided a
basis for deciding like cases in like fashion.
Of course, there were many who were more than willing to supply the
proper ratio decidendi. Some have been memorable only for their quirki-
ness. 33 Others, however, have constructed quite cogent models of how the
holding in Roe might be defended. 34 The most persuasive of these focus
either on constitutional provisions other than those cited by the Court or
rely on analysis largely freed from text (a California-style methodology).35
These methods may lead to convenient results, but create problems of their
own: analyses freed from text raise very serious questions concerning the
Court's legitimacy and accountability.
Harry Wellington has attempted to steer a middle course, between text
and California feel-good, to see if a concept he labels "public morality" can
help us understand the constitutional problems inherent in the abortion
question. Wellington begins his analysis by comparing common law and
constitutional adjudication. Although the two are similar in many respects
(especially in the need to ensure that like cases are treated in like fashion),
Wellington observes that constitutional decision-making is distinctive be-
cause it challenges an interpretation of the Constitution already made by
another government actor.36 "Judges ought to be modest" and respect the
decision of other branches unless there is some "special function" to be
found in the "politics of appellate adjudication. '37 For Wellington, this
function is to "articulate the principles used to elaborate text in the past,
principles that often acquired their weight in public morality and that must
be reinterpreted in terms of a contemporary understanding of that
morality. '38
This notion of public morality plays a central role in Wellington's theory.
While he views public morality as neither the only source of law nor as nec-
essarily controlling, 39 he does believe that "reasoning from these commonly
concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or,
as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of
rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
33. Discretion precludes any citation for this point.
34. See, e.g., Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955
(1984); Susan Estrich and Kathleen Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of
One, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (1989); Donald Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L.
REV. 1569 (1979).
35. Arguments other than those based on the due process clause (such as equal protec-
tion) can also be made, of course. See, e.g., Law, supra note 34. This review does not address
those arguments.
36. WELLINGTON, supra note 19, at 82.
37. Id. at 83.
38. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 86. Wellington uses the recent Flag Burning Cases, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397 (1989), as counter-examples. WELLINGTON, supra note 19, at 88. Wellington be-
lieves that public morality strongly condemns flag burning. Id. Nevertheless, he contends
that the Court was correct in striking down the flag burning laws because of the force of
1992]
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held attitudes should be an important method for interpreting the values-
the public morality-that are a source of law in elaborating the term 'liberty'
in the Fourteenth Amendment." 4 "Public morality is the workhorse of in-
terpretation."'4 1 This concept can then be used effectively to inform judges
of the scope of due process. Moreover, it can be an effective vehicle for
constitutional change,42 as a changing public morality can help stimulate
constitutional adjustment to different (and often difficult) times.
Wellington uses a series of well-constructed hypothetical situations to dis-
cern public morality on the abortion issue. 43 His approach is intuitive, not
empirical. He seeks to find the occasions (although not really the reasons)
why and when our society accepts and rejects abortion. He finds that the
abortion question involves two different types of public morality-the right
to abort and the state's interest in protecting potential life." Nevertheless,
this conflict has some limits. Wellington concludes:
(1) that we do commonly draw an important moral distinction between
fetal life and other kinds of human life, (2) that this distinction does not
mean that fetal life may be disregarded, but that it does enable us to
make other distinctions that in its absence would be morally impermis-
sible, (3) that one such distinction, which has considerable intuitive ap-
peal, counts the survival of a fetus that "would be born with grave
physical or mental defect" less than the survival of a normal fetus, and
(4) that while the chief appeal of this last distinction rests in a widely
held preference for the birth of a healthy child, it also gives weight to
the principle that a woman "has a right to decide what shall happen in
and to her body."'4 5
This conclusion, however, is both a sword and a shield. Wellington recog-
nizes that "the weight of the principle that supports a woman's claim to an
abortion ... is also related to the state's interest in the potential for life."
46
That recognition, in turn, leads him to conclude that his "arguments do not
justify the sweep of Roe v. Wade."'47
That last conclusion, of course, raises the issue of whether Roe should be
modified or overruled. Wellington admonishes the Court to be very careful:
[S]tare decisis places the Court under an obligation to act as wisely as
possible, to consider all the consequences of overruling its own interpre-
tation of the Constitution. This requires that judicial attention be paid
to the disproportionate impact that overturning Roe would have in
some of the nation's fifty states.., on poor women-namely, the prob-
"structure, history, and precedent." Id. Unfortunately, he does not explain why those forces
are strong enough to overcome the force of public morality.
40. Id. at 107.
41. Id. at 88.
42. Id. at 20.
43. Id. at 106-23.
44. Id. at 107.
45. Id. at 106-07.
46. Id. at 107.
47. Id. at 100. Here, Wellington is careful to point out that he is speaking from a consti-
tutional rather than a legislative perspective. Id
[Vol. 46
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able increases in death caused by back-alley abortions. 48
This very functional approach to stare decisis places a strong hand on the
scales in favor of maintaining Roe. It also achieves, perhaps conveniently,
the result Wellington suggests he would vote for if he were a legislator.
49
Wellington's ipse dixit, however, ignores the competing public morality he
has identified in his analysis of the abortion hypothetical situations-the
state's interest in the potential life of the fetus. It is difficult to understand
how Wellington's pragmatic approach to stare decisis can be reconciled with
that interest. He makes little effort to do so.50
Wellington's discussion of public morality and abortion is incomplete. A
demanding Legal Process analysis of public morality and the right to privacy
requires an explanation of how far the right extends. That explanation must
justify both the extension and the stopping point, for without those last two
pieces of analysis it is impossible to know when like cases are decided in like
fashion. Wellington's conclusion, quoted above, provides a starting point.
Unfortunately, the analysis leading to that conclusion is too intuitive-it
fails to explain satisfactorily why the lines established by Wellington should
be drawn. Nevertheless, it is a good starting point for the work of others.
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC MORALITY
Wellington writes well and persuasively. The text seduces the reader into
easy agreement. There are serious problems, however, inherent in establish-
ing public morality as a component of constitutional decision-making.
Where does the authority to use public morality come from, and how do the
Justices know when to use it?
A. PUBLIC MORALITY AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Part of the problem with Wellington's exposition of the virtues of public
morality is that it virtually ignores the language and history of the Constitu-
tion. He does not find those sources completely irrelevant; after all, he is
willing to strike down the flag-burning legislation on those grounds.5' It is
just that he does not really come to grips with the question of how public
morality interacts with more traditional -methods of interpreting the
document.
This problem becomes particularly acute when the Due Process Clause is
involved. There are two problems here. First, it is difficult to argue either
48. Id. at 112.
49. Id. at 108.
50. Wellington rejects Justice O'Connor's attempt in Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv-
ices, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), to separate a woman's right to an abortion from the state's interest in
the potential life of the fetus. WELLINGTON, supra note 19, at 117-18. He finds that the two
interests overlap sharply. Id. at 110. But he offers little in the way of reconciling the two
interests.
5 1. See WELLINGTON, supra note 19, at 88. Wellington does not explain why public mo-
rality can be ignored in the Flag-Burning Cases. E.g. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
His failure to do so suggests strongly that to him consensus on public morality works best
when that consensus is on his side.
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historically or linguistically that the Clause has a substantive component.
The concept of due process is deeply rooted in procedure, and the text gives
little comfort to those who would use it to strike down bad legislation. 52
Second, the history of the Court's use of substantive due process doctrines
has not been a happy one. There is, of course, as every law student learns,
the sorry episode of economic due process exemplified by the Lochner deci-
sion. The Court's insistence on economic due process in this era eventually
led to a major constitutional crisis. Even the privacy brand of substantive
due process that supports Roe has given the Court trouble. These problems
have not yet been addressed, however, because the Court simply has not
pushed the logic of Roe to consistency in later decisions, where the principle
of personal privacy/autonomy might well have been invoked. 53 Wellington,
who is certainly aware of these problems, gives no reason to hope that a
Justice applying public morality in the service of substantive due process
would reach happier results.
B. WHOSE MORALITY?
Perhaps the most basic charge against substantive due process is that it
permits the Justices to substitute their notions of what is correct for those
notions held by the legislature. Why, after all, should the views of the non-
elected judiciary prevail over the legislature on some issues? This question
may not be hard to answer when rooted in constitutional text and history.
Answering it for open-ended constitutional inquiries based on as amorphous
a concept as public morality is another matter. It simply is not easy to un-
derstand why appointed judges can do that task better than elected legisla-
tors, when the interpreter cannot rely either on text or on history-those
areas where judges and lawyers might lay claim to a special expertise.54
Learned Hand perhaps expressed the problem best: "for myself, it would be
most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of platonic guardians, even if I knew how
to choose them, which I assuredly do not."'55
Wellington does not really respond to this charge, although he does recog-
nize it as a problem. 56 Wellington's delineation, quoted above, of the respec-
tive rights of the mother and of the state's interest in the fetus is merely
52. Justice Brandeis, among others, found this argument to be "persuasive." Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). But see Robert E. Riggs, Sub-
stantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 941. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Sub-
stance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85 (examining the rationale of the constitutional
dichotomy between substance and process).
53. The prime example is Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in which the Court
upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults. Id. at 196. Wel-
lington agrees that Bowers cannot be reconciled with Roe. WELLINGTON, supra note 19, at
120.
54. See WELLINGTON, supra note 19, at 83-85.
55. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958). For a similar discussion of the
concept of equality in the jurisprudence of the Equal Protection Clause, see Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 539 (1982).
56. Wellington merely states that "example" and "context" are required. WELLINGTON,
supra note 19, at 87.
[Vol. 46
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rhetorical.5 7 That is, Wellington does not advance arguments based on em-
pirical data, and he does not reason from policies drawn from statutes in
closely related areas. Rather, his appeal is to our intuitive sense of what is
moral and what is not. In that sense, his conclusion cannot satisfy the basic
tenet of Legal Process jurisprudence, of laying down a rule capable of being
generalized and that can provide a basis for explaining other decisions.
C. STARE DECISIS
Wellington is on sounder ground when it comes to the wisdom of making
significant changes in Roe. The reason, ironically enough, is due to the
amorphous nature of public morality. The proponent of changing existing
case law, of course, bears the burden of proof. It is difficult to see how that
burden can be met, at least if the question is whether public morality on
abortion has changed significantly since 1973. Resolving that question
would require analysis of legislative action on abortion over the past two
decades. 58 Those tea leaves would be particularly difficult to read, given that
all legislation has been written in order to comply with the Roe protection of
the right to privacy. It would be difficult, therefore, to justify any significant
change in Roe by reference to the concept of a change in public morality.59
The weight of stare decisis, in other words, requires strong evidence of a
different public morality in order to set precedent aside. 6°
V. CONSTITUTIONAL DESUETUDE?
That there are problems with a concept, however, does not mean that it
should be discarded. Perhaps its use can be limited. That is certainly true of
public morality. Wellington's own examples make clear the utility of the
concept in certain limited situations. Thus, he argues that laws disadvantag-
ing women are unconstitutional because of "changing national attitudes
about the importance of gender equality. These attitudes reflect widely
shared public values. They constitute a public morality. ' ' 61 Similarly, Wel-
lington writes that the ban on the sale of contraceptives to married couples
struck down in Griswold was properly subjected to "robust" judicial re-
57. See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
58. This was one method used in Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976), to uphold the constitutionality of state imposition of the death sentence
for murder. Id. at 179-81.
59. Justice Marshall's dissent in Gregg questioned the relevance of legislative action on the
ground that only the views of an "informed citizenry" could be relevant. Id. at 232 (emphasis
in original).
60. Justice O'Connor's analysis of the stare decisis question in the "joint opinion" in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), only adverts briefly
to the amorphous notion of public morality concerning abortion. Her opinion first rests on the
comfortable ground that a court should not upset that which has been settled without strong
reason for doing so. The stare decisis portion of the opinion then turns to the far more troub-
ling argument that the Court should be especially reluctant to overrule when there is "an
intensively divisive controversy." Id. at 2815. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist, id. at 2860-67,
and Justice Scalia, id. at 2881-85, showed the inherent difficulties with that argument.
61. WELLINGTON, supra note 19, at 85-86.
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view.62 Although the statute presumably reflected a contemporary version
of public morality when drafted, the public's view of morality had changed
in the decades since its adoption. The "passage of time," in other words,
"should have eliminated any deference that the Court might have paid to-
ward the legislature's interpretation of public morality." 63
The two problems of gender discrimination and ban on contraceptive sales
provide easy examples of statutes where deference to legislative decisions can
no longer be justified in the light of changing public morality. The Griswold
discussion is a particularly apt example in this respect. Because the goal of
that statute was to serve public morality, it was especially easy to challenge
its continued existence on the ground that public morality had changed in
the four decades since its adoption. In this respect, indeed, Wellington
seems to be reworking at a constitutional level the notion advanced by his
successor as Dean of the Yale Law School, Guido Calabresi, that the courts
have the power to invalidate obsolete statutes.64 Moreover, both situations
provide easy examples of cases where the invalidation of legislation hurts no
one (assuming, of course, that this kind of bringing up to date of public
morality can be characterized in that fashion). It is much more difficult,
however, to see how changing notions of public morality come into play
when the effect of the statute is necessarily to hurt someone. Law, of course,
is not always a win-win game with no losers. How would changing notions
of public morality, for example, affect the decision in a case involving
whether affirmative action is constitutionally permissible. After all, is not
one goal of judicial review to protect the loser in the legislative process?
Wellington's partial reply to these criticisms would be that public morality
is only one aspect of judicial decision-making. In the absence of some better
criteria as to when public morality comes into play, other than to override
obsolete statutes where the effect is not to harm members of another class,
Wellington does not provide sufficient guidance to the contours of its useful-
ness. Of course, that is the subject of another book.
VI. CONCLUSION
Much of the above criticism is pure carping. Wellington did not set out to
answer all questions concerning Roe v. Wade or even to address all questions
concerning the public morality aspects of that decision. But any theory of
constitutional decision-making premised on a concept like public morality
carries significant liabilities. The theory's proponent must advance some
method of showing when and why it works and when and why it does not.
Wellington's failure to do so in the abortion and flag-burning situations
makes it hard to understand the sweep of his theory. Nevertheless, the con-
cept of public morality is an intriguing one, with significant possibilities in-
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cluding constitutional desuetude. I hope Wellington will continue to explore
this area.
This review has focused on privacy and Wellington's concept of public
morality because that is what I found most intriguing about Interpreting the
Constitution. The book is, however, much more than simple analysis of Roe
v. Wade and its implications for privacy in the context of public morality.
Wellington presents a concise, readable, and yet sophisticated synopsis of the
current debate over constitutional interpretation. I recommend this work
highly to both constitutional tyros and legal professionals.

